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 On 19 January 1974, the Chinese and South Vietnamese navies clashed near the disputed Paracel Islands� The short but intense battle left China in 
control of seemingly unremarkable spits of land and surrounding waters in the 
South China Sea� The skirmish involved small, secondhand combatants armed 
with outdated weaponry� The fighting lasted for several hours, producing modest 
casualties in ships and men� The incident merited little public attention, espe-
cially when compared with past titanic struggles at sea, such as those of the two 
world wars� Unsurprisingly, the battle remains an understudied, if not forgotten, 
episode in naval history�1
But its obscurity is undeserved� Newly available Chinese-language sources 
reveal a far more complex naval operation than is commonly depicted in West-
ern scholarship�2 Hitherto-unknown details of the battle illustrate how Chinese 
strategists tailored their tactics so as to coerce, deter, and defeat a rival claimant 
in the South China Sea� Notably, China employed a mix of conventional and ir-
regular forces to meet its operational objectives� Such hybrid methods not only 
were common in Chinese naval history, but also foreshadowed the kinds of 
combined maritime warfare China has employed 
recently against its neighbors in maritime Asia, 
including Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines� In-
deed, Chinese operations in the Paracels represent 
an archetype that could be employed again in the 
future� It thus behooves policymakers to pay atten-
tion to China’s naval past�
The battle was the first step in China’s decades-
long effort to establish and expand its presence 
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in the South China Sea� In 1988, China seized six reefs and atolls of the Spratly 
Islands after another skirmish with the Vietnamese at Johnson South Reef� In 
late 1994, the Chinese built structures on Philippines-claimed Mischief Reef, 
leaving a weak Manila no choice but to accept the fait accompli� In 2012, China 
compelled the Philippines to yield control of Scarborough Shoal after a standoff 
at sea over fishing rights in the area� Beginning in late 2013, China embarked on a 
massive land reclamation project in the Spratlys, building up artificial islands that 
added up to thousands of acres of land� Some of the man-made islands feature 
military-grade runways, deep-draft piers to accommodate warships, facilities to 
host garrisons, and other support infrastructure� China’s extension of its mari-
time power into the South China Sea, which has gathered momentum in recent 
years, began with the foothold gained in the Paracels� 
The conflict and its aftermath also left an outsize and lasting legacy in Asian 
international relations� The territorial dispute that gave rise to fighting forty years 
ago remains unresolved and continues to stoke Sino-Vietnamese enmity� When 
Beijing placed an oil rig in waters close to the Paracels in May 2014, violent pro-
tests targeting Chinese businesses broke out across Vietnam� At sea, Vietnamese 
maritime law enforcement vessels sought to break the security cordon formed 
around the rig by Chinese civilian, paramilitary, and naval vessels� Amid the 
standoff, bilateral relations plunged to new lows� The contest, then, is far from 
over; and the passions the dispute still stirs up trace back to 1974�
The Paracels battle erupted at an inflection point in the history of China’s tur-
bulent politics� The nation was still reeling from the Cultural Revolution when 
the fighting broke out� The radical political movement had so ravaged military 
readiness that the Chinese navy nearly paid for it with defeat in the Paracels cam-
paign� Mao Zedong devoted attention to the crisis, issuing his last military orders 
during the conflict before his death two years later� Deng Xiaoping, rehabilitated 
from the purges of the Cultural Revolution, oversaw the naval campaign� Liu 
Huaqing formulated fortification plans for the Paracels not long after the smoke 
had cleared from the battlefield� Deng, the architect of China’s reform and open-
ing, and Liu, the father of the modern Chinese navy, would later navigate their 
nation out of the dark era under Mao� Their roles in this clash likely served them 
well as they positioned themselves to lead China�
For the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA Navy, or PLAN), the campaign is 
etched into the service’s institutional memory, constituting an essential part of the 
navy’s “glorious history�”3 The “counterattack in self-defense” vanquished South 
Vietnam’s navy and secured China’s control over the Paracels�4 It is considered 
the PLA Navy’s first sea battle against an external enemy� (The fighting against 
the Nationalists along the mainland coast in the 1950s and 1960s is regarded 
as an extension of the Chinese civil war�) The battle was also the first time that 
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the PLAN—then largely a coastal-defense force composed of obsolescent Soviet 
vessels—operated so far from China’s shores� The disparity in naval power that 
seemingly favored South Vietnam, (Republic of Vietnam, or RVN) has helped 
Chinese commentators mythologize the triumph�
The battle’s legacies, ranging from regional animosity to China’s strategic 
position in the South China Sea, call for a closer reexamination� The availability 
of relevant Chinese literature now makes it possible to extract insights from the 
clash� Reconstructing a clearer picture of the Sino-Vietnamese encounter at sea 
helps to discern the ingredients of the Chinese navy’s operational success� More-
over, a retrospective analysis draws out the continuities in China’s use of force and 
coercion at sea� In particular, Beijing’s combined employment of military and ci-
vilian vessels in 1974 suggests a durable operational preference for hybrid warfare 
that is evident today in territorial disputes involving China� Such predispositions 
carry implications for the various rival claimants in the South China Sea and for 
the United States as the arbiter of security and stability in maritime Asia�
To maximize the analytical value of the naval skirmish, this article first re-
views the geographic setting and the historical context of the Paracels dispute� It 
recounts in greater detail the tit-for-tat maneuvers near the islands that brought 
China and South Vietnam to conflict� The article then elaborates on the naval 
battle and its aftermath, as the Chinese have retold them� It furnishes an as-
sessment of the battle, critically analyzing China’s civil-military relations, the 
operational performance of the PLAN, the role of friction and chance, and the 
importance of paramilitary forces to Beijing� Finally, the article concludes with 
some thoughts about how the battle may inform China’s future strategy in the 
South China Sea and its implications for stakeholders in maritime Asia�
SOURCES AND METHODS
In recent years, Chinese historical accounts of the Paracels sea battle have prolif-
erated across publicly available sources, including PLAN publications, academic 
journals, professional periodicals, and popular magazines� Participants in the 
campaign, from local commanders to tactical personnel, have agreed to inter-
views or produced their own eyewitness accounts, reflecting on their personal ex-
periences� They have revealed fascinating details about the engagement and have 
forthrightly offered critical assessments of how the Chinese waged the campaign� 
A general openness to debate on politically neutral topics, including naval 
affairs, partly explains this willingness to engage in frank discussions about 
the battle� For over a decade the Chinese leadership has permitted a relatively 
freewheeling discourse among officials, scholars, and commentators of various 
stripes, encouraging them to hold forth on China’s seaborne future� President 
Xi Jinping’s vow to transform China into a maritime power has further spurred 
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seapower advocates to retail narratives that justify the nation’s turn to the seas� 
China’s operational success in 1974 tells an uplifting story that dovetails with 
recent Chinese efforts to promote the navy as a prized national project and to 
enhance the society’s “maritime consciousness�” And, in light of Beijing’s ambi-
tions and growing capacity to influence events in the South China Sea, the history 
of the Paracels battle resonates with Chinese audiences�
The attention lavished on this incident opens a window onto China’s interpre-
tations of its own naval history�5 Indeed, the literature helps to discern lessons the 
Chinese have drawn from this battle as well as to identify lessons they may have 
neglected or chosen to ignore� If these lessons—and false lessons—hold value for 
China’s policymakers and military commanders, the battle may offer insights into 
current Chinese strategy in offshore disputes� Equally important, Beijing’s grow-
ing assertiveness in maritime Asia, including its construction of artificial islands 
in the Spratlys, is likely to increase policy demands in Washington and other 
Asian capitals to understand better how China views its seascape�
Some caveats about sources and methods merit mentioning� This article is 
based almost entirely on Chinese writings of the battle, including the PLAN’s 
record of events, recollections of the participants involved in the clash, and sec-
ondary sources� China’s sparse experiences at sea, especially in the first decades of 
communist rule, may have compelled Chinese analysts to dramatize overly, and 
thus potentially distort, their nation’s naval successes� Not surprisingly, Chinese 
accounts frequently portray the enemy unflatteringly while playing up China’s 
virtues� Xenophobic biases and cheap propaganda points abound� What follows, 
therefore, is not a neutral perspective�
While the Vietnamese side of the story is not represented here, this article 
draws on the few available English-language memoirs by RVN naval officers who 
were involved in the clash�6 It pays special attention to recollections that diverge 
sharply from the Chinese version of events� Moreover, discrepancies exist among 
the various Chinese descriptions of the battle� To the extent possible, this article 
identifies those differences, recognizing that a definitive story is not possible 
without access to official archives in both China and Vietnam� This is a first cut at 
an important but largely underappreciated episode in China’s march to the seas�
THE GEOSTRATEGIC CONTEXT
The Paracel (西沙) Islands are roughly equidistant from China and Vietnam, lo-
cated 300 kilometers south of Yulin, Hainan Island, and 370 kilometers east of Da 
Nang� The archipelago is composed of coral islands, reefs, and banks divided into 
two island groups� To the northeast is the Amphitrite (宣德) Group, in which 
Woody (永兴) Island is the largest feature� To the southwest is the Crescent (永
乐) Group, consisting of Pattle (珊瑚), Money (金银), and Robert (甘泉) Islands 
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on the western side and Drummond (晋卿), Duncan (琛航), and Palm (广金) 
Islands on the eastern side. About eighty kilometers of water separate the Am-
phitrite and Crescent Groups.
Chinese writings emphasize the geostrategic value of the Paracels, which sit 
astride critical lines of communications. According to the PLAN’s official en-
cyclopedia, “The Paracel Islands serve as China’s natural protective screen and 
outpost. Sea and air routes heading to Singapore and Jakarta from China’s coast 
must pass through this area, giving it an important status.”7 Located about 660 
kilometers southwest of the Pratas Islands, 550 kilometers west of Scarborough 
MAP 2




Source: Adapted from “Paracel and Spratly Islands: 1988,” Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/.
MAP 3
Source: “Paracel Islands, South China Sea,” [CartoGIS] Maps Online: ANU 
[Australian National University] College of Asia & the Pacific, asiapacific 
.anu.edu.au/mapsonline/.
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Shoal, and 700 kilometers northwest of the Spratly Islands, the centrally posi-
tioned archipelago is viewed as an essential stepping-stone to other Chinese-
claimed islands across the South China Sea�
After the Second World War, the islands changed hands repeatedly, with coun-
tries asserting a confusing array of claims and counterclaims to the Paracels� In 
1947, the Nationalists on the Chinese mainland seized control of Woody Island, 
while the French, employing local Vietnamese troops, occupied Pattle Island at 
the other end of the Paracels� The communist conquest of Hainan Island, one of 
the last holdouts of the Chinese civil war, rendered untenable the Nationalist out-
post on Woody Island� PLA troops seized the island after the Nationalist forces 
evacuated it in 1950� In the 1951 San Francisco peace treaty, Japan renounced all 
its rights and claims to the Paracels and Spratlys but left the transfer of title unre-
solved� South Vietnam and China subsequently issued official declarations that 
incorporated the Paracels as sovereign territory, in 1956 and 1958, respectively�8
In the meantime, China and South Vietnam occupied two halves of the Para-
cels� In 1955, a Chinese state-owned company began to mine guano on Woody 
Island for use as fertilizer back on the mainland� The following year, the French 
transferred Pattle Island to the Republic of Vietnam� In early 1959, Saigon’s navy 
forcibly evicted Chinese fishermen from Duncan Island, thereby conferring 
on South Vietnam control over the Crescent Group� Throughout the 1960s, an 
uneasy stalemate prevailed as both sides built modest facilities and episodically 
patrolled the waters around the islands�9 It is likely that the substantial U�S� naval 
presence in the region and Washington’s backing of Saigon deterred China from 
rolling back South Vietnam’s control of the disputed islands�
In the 1970s, the promise of offshore oil intensified the dispute in the South 
China Sea� In mid-1973, Saigon granted energy exploration rights to Western 
companies and conducted geological surveys of the waters near the Crescent 
Group� That year, Beijing explicitly claimed the maritime resources present in 
waters adjacent to Chinese territory� China, too, began drilling an oil well on 
Woody Island in December 1973�10 The convergence of geopolitics, economics, 
and competing territorial claims soon drew China and South Vietnam into an 
escalating crisis�
PRELUDE TO BATTLE
In the summer of 1973, a series of provocations and reprisals set the two sides 
on a collision course� In August, South Vietnam seized six islands in the Spratlys, 
and a month later issued a formal declaration extending Saigon’s administra-
tive control over ten islands there� In October, two Chinese fishing trawlers, 
Nos� 402 and 407, appeared near the Crescent Group and began to work there� 
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The crewmen planted Chinese flags on islands over which the Vietnamese had 
established nominal control� They also set up a logistics team on Duncan Island, 
reestablishing a presence there, from which South Vietnam had evicted them 
more than a decade before�11 In November, South Vietnamese warships began 
to harass the Chinese fishing boats, ramming them and arresting fishermen on 
board� Some of the captured Chinese were reportedly brought to Da Nang, where 
they were forced to confess their alleged crimes and acknowledge Saigon’s sover-
eignty over the islands�
On 10 January 1974, the crews of the two Chinese fishing boats constructed a 
seafood processing plant on Robert Island�12 The following day, the Chinese for-
eign ministry reiterated China’s indisputable sovereignty over the Paracel Islands, 
the Spratly (南沙) Islands, and Macclesfield (中沙) Bank� Four days later, the 
RVN Navy dispatched the frigate HQ-16 to the Crescent Group� Upon encoun-
tering fishing boats Nos� 402 and 407 near Robert Island, HQ-16 ordered the 
two vessels to leave the area�13 The frigate then fired warning shots at them and 
shelled Robert Island, blasting the Chinese flag planted there� On 17 January, the 
destroyer HQ-4 arrived on the scene to support HQ-16� Commandos on board 
HQ-4 landed on Robert and Money Islands, pulling down Chinese flags there� 
The following day, HQ-4 and HQ-16 rammed fishing vessel No� 407, damaging 
it� That evening, frigate HQ-5 and fleet minesweeper HQ-10 joined in�14
After receiving reports from Nos� 402 and 407 about the RVN’s naval activities, 
China began to sortie its forces� On 16 January, the South Sea Fleet ordered two 
Kronshtadt-class submarine chasers, Nos� 271 and 274, to reach Woody Island as 
soon as possible� The two warships hurried to their destination from Yulin naval 
base on Hainan Island� After picking up armed maritime militia, ammunition, 
and supplies at Woody Island the next day, Nos� 271 and 274 proceeded to the 
Crescent Group� The commanders were under strict instructions to follow three 
don’ts: (1) don’t stir up trouble; (2) don’t fire the first shot; and (3) don’t get the 
worst of it�15 J-6 fighters (the Chinese version of the MiG-19) provided air cover 
during the flotilla’s transit, but their limited range permitted only five minutes of 
loiter time over the Paracels�16 The warships would have to fend for themselves�
The two sub chasers reached the Crescent Group on the evening of 17 Janu-
ary and landed four armed militia platoons (each numbering ten members) on 
Duncan, Drummond, and Palm Islands in the wee hours of 18 January�17 At about 
the same time, two Guangzhou-based Type 010 oceangoing minesweepers, Nos� 
389 and 396, rushed to the Paracels to reinforce Nos� 271 and 274�
In a sign of the PLAN’s desperation, the No� 389 boat had just undergone 
major shipyard repairs and was not yet certified for sea duty� Worse still, the 
South Sea Fleet’s most capable frigates, the Type 065s, were unavailable owing 
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to unspecified mechanical problems� 
Instead, the PLAN had to fall back on 
two Hainan-class sub chasers, Nos� 281 
and 282, attached to a coastal garrison 
division in Shantou, nearly nine hundred 
kilometers from Hainan� The pair sped to 
Woody Island, refueling along the way in 
Zhanjiang and Yulin�
China’s navy was clearly scrambling to 
assemble its forces� The Cultural Revolu-
tion was largely responsible for the fleet’s 
state of disrepair� Nonetheless, the pieces 
were in place for confrontation� The hast-
ily organized flotilla, four vessels in for-
ward positions and two in the rear, were 
to protect the fishing boats and resupply 
the maritime militia on the islands�
THE BATTLE
On the morning of 19 January, the South 
Vietnamese warships approached the 
Chinese flotilla from two directions� 
HQ-4 and HQ-5 circled around Money 
Island and Antelope Reef from the south toward Palm and Duncan Islands, while 
HQ-10 and HQ-16 cut across the central lagoon of the Crescent Group from the 
northwest� Sub chasers Nos� 271 and 274 were directed to monitor HQ-4 and 
HQ-5 while Nos� 396 and 389 shadowed HQ-10 and HQ-16� In a bid to break 
the stalemate, HQ-16 forced its way past the two Chinese ships and launched two 
rubber boats carrying commandos to land on Duncan and Palm Islands�18 The 
Vietnamese assault forces ran right into the Chinese militia, which had dug in 
the day before� On Duncan Island, bayonet-wielding militiamen drove the com-
mandos off the beach� On Palm Island, the defenders shot dead one Vietnamese 
and wounded three others, forcing the landing party to retreat to its mother ship� 
During the maneuver to land the commandos, HQ-16 rammed and damaged 
No� 389�19 
Up to this point, the confrontation at sea had involved only maneuver, with 
no shots fired in anger� Chinese naval commanders, moreover, followed orders 
not to initiate the fight� Unable to dislodge their foes at sea and ashore, the RVN 
warships repositioned themselves into battle formation and charged the PLAN 
units� Bearing down on the Chinese vessels, they unleashed the initial salvo� The 
Source: John E. Moore, ed., Jane’s Fighting Ships, 1975–76 (New York: Franklin 
Watts, 1975).
No� 271 and 
No� 274
Class: Kronshtadt-class submarine chaser
Displacement: 310 tons  
Armament: one 3�5-inch gun
No� 389 and 
No� 396
Class: Type 010 ocean minesweeper
Displacement: 500 tons
Armament: two 37 mm guns
No� 281 and 
No� 282
Class: Hainan-class submarine chaser
Displacement: 500 tons
Armament: two 3-inch guns
PLAN ORDER OF BATTLE
HQ-5 and 
HQ-16
Class: Barnegat-class seaplane tender
Displacement: 1,766 tons 
Armament: one 5-inch gun
HQ-4 Class: Edsall-class destroyer escort
Displacement: 1,590 tons
Armament: two 3-inch guns 
HQ-10 Class: Admirable-class minesweeper 
Displacement: 650 tons
Armament: one 3-inch gun
Source: Moore, Jane’s Fighting Ships, 1975–76.
RVN NAVY ORDER OF BATTLE
NWC_Spring2016Review.indb   48 3/8/16   10:29 AM
8
Naval War College Review, Vol. 69 [2016], No. 2, Art. 6
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss2/6
 YO S H I HA R A  4 9
Vietnamese directed their fire at the ships’ bridges, killing No� 247’s political 
commissar, Feng Songbai, on the spot�20 After taking direct hits, minesweeper 
No� 389 caught fire and began to take on water�
The PLAN units immediately returned fire and surged toward the opponent’s 
warships� The commanders received orders to “speed forward, fight close, and 
hit hard�”21 The smaller, faster, and nimbler Chinese vessels purposefully sought 
close combat (贴身战, literally, “stick-to-body combat”) against the larger, lum-
bering, and slower-firing RVN units�22 The tactic was to draw so near that the 
enemy’s main deck guns would overshoot their targets� By fighting while shelter-
ing in these blind spots, the Chinese effectively nullified the superior range and 
lethality of the enemy’s firepower� The PLAN commanders chose a knife fight 
against an adversary expecting a gunfight�
The RVN vessels sought to keep their distance, but the Chinese ships quickly 
homed in from several thousand meters to hundreds of meters�23 Sub chasers 
Nos� 271 and 274 concentrated their fire on HQ-4 while Nos� 396 and 389 at-
tacked HQ-16� The PLAN units took aim at communication gear, radars, and 
command posts to blind and deafen the enemy� In the intense exchange of fire, 
HQ-4 started to fill with smoke�24 To the north, Nos� 396 and 389 drove off 
HQ-16 after fierce fighting and then turned on HQ-10�25 In the melee, HQ-10’s 
magazine exploded from a direct hit� By this time, the combatants were tangling 
only tens of meters from each other� At such close range, No� 389’s crew raked 
HQ-10’s deck with small-arms fire, killing the ship’s captain�26
HQ-16 retreated to the open sea after No� 396 turned back its attempts to 
reach HQ-10� Following some more exchanges of fire, HQ-4 and HQ-5 also left 
the scene, leaving behind the crippled HQ-10� In the meantime, No� 389 was in 
trouble� The badly mauled ship listed heavily and its crew could not extinguish 
the fire� Despite the risk of an explosion, trawlers Nos� 402 and 407 helped beach 
the heavily damaged minesweeper on Duncan Island� Sub chasers Nos� 281 and 
282 arrived from Woody Island belatedly, at around noon, and attacked HQ-10 
three times, sinking the ship just south of Antelope Reef�27 HQ-16, HQ-4, and 
HQ-5 loitered to the west of the Crescent Group but did not attempt to reengage 
the PLAN units�28
The Chinese moved quickly to retake Vietnamese-occupied islands� They 
wanted to cement their victory at sea; the naval command also feared that the op-
ponent might counterattack with reinforcements� The South Sea Fleet mobilized 
one frigate, five torpedo boats, and eight patrol boats for the follow-on operation� 
The amphibious assault fleet, organized into three transport flotillas, was ordered 
to send ashore three infantry companies (each numbering about one hundred), 
one amphibious reconnaissance team, and the armed militia, totaling five 
hundred troops� The first flotilla consisted of four patrol craft accompanied by 
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fishing boats Nos� 402 and 407, hauling one infantry company� Four patrol craft 
and minesweeper No� 396 formed the second flotilla, with one infantry company 
and one reconnaissance team on board� The single frigate doubled as the third 
flotilla and the command ship, carrying one infantry company�29
The first flotilla assembled before Robert Island on the morning of 20 Janu-
ary� The patrol boats shelled the island to suppress the defenders there� Three 
platoons embarked in rubber rafts and sampans conducted the amphibious as-
sault, seizing the island in about ten minutes� Shortly thereafter, the patrol boats 
and the minesweeper of the second flotilla opened fire on Pattle Island� As PLA 
troops landed, some thirty Vietnamese retreated to the middle of the island, 
where they eventually surrendered� Among those captured were a major in the 
South Vietnamese army and an American liaison officer from the U�S� embassy 
in Saigon� By the time the PLAN turned to Money Island, the Chinese found that 
the RVN commandos had already abandoned their positions�30
When the fighting was over, it was clear who had won� The PLAN had sunk 
one minesweeper, damaged three warships, killed or wounded over a hundred 
Vietnamese officers and sailors, captured forty-eight soldiers, and seized three 
islands, bringing the entire Paracel archipelago under China’s control� The RVN 
Navy put one Chinese minesweeper out of action, shot up three other warships, 
killed eighteen, and wounded sixty-seven others�31
THE BATTLE’S AFTERMATH
Stung by the defeat, Saigon threatened to escalate� The South Vietnamese navy 
reportedly sent two destroyers to reinforce Da Nang and directed six warships 
to head toward the Paracels�32 The RVN high command also alerted all ground, 
naval, and air forces to heighten readiness for war� President Nguyen Van Thieu, 
who arrived in Da Nang to oversee his forces personally, allegedly ordered the 
South Vietnamese air force to bomb Chinese positions on the Paracels—before 
rescinding the decision� At the same time, Saigon requested assistance from the 
U�S� Seventh Fleet, but to no avail�
The Chinese girded for a Vietnamese counterattack� The Military Affairs 
Commission (MAC) instructed the Guangzhou Military Region to supply the 
defenders holding the Paracels� Yulin naval base soon became a logistical hub, 
organizing substantial quantities of ammunition, weaponry, fuel, medicine, food, 
water, and other supplies for delivery� The MAC placed all forces on high alert 
and detached three Type 01 Chengdu-class guided-missile frigates from the East 
Sea Fleet to reinforce their comrades� Equipped with SY-1 subsonic antiship 
cruise missiles, the frigates packed the kind of punch that the South Sea Fleet 
lacked� Mao Zedong personally ordered the three ships to transit the Taiwan 
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Strait—the most direct route to the Paracels—despite concerns that Nationalist 
forces on Taiwan and the offshore islands might ambush the flotilla on its way 
south�33 Mao’s gamble paid off when the three frigates arrived safely after an un-
eventful, though nerve-racking, voyage�34
The South Sea Fleet also called into service Type 033 Romeo-class submarines, 
including 157, 158, and 159, based in Yulin�35 On 20 January, submarine 157 
undertook an unusual refueling mission after an oiler grounded on North Reef� 
After the sub topped off patrol craft near Woody Island, it returned to port�36 Sub-
marine 158 departed Yulin on 22 January to patrol the waters between Da Nang 
and Pattle Island� Attesting to Chinese anxieties about a Vietnamese riposte, its 
mission was to monitor enemy fleet movements and sink—without prior ap-
proval from high command—any RVN warships heading toward the Paracels�37 
Intriguingly, a PLAN sonarman later claimed that he had detected a U�S� nuclear-
powered attack submarine that had been “tracking us for a long time�”38 Subma-
rine 159 subsequently took the place of submarine 158—under stricter rules of 
engagement, as fears of an RVN counterstrike receded�
This show of force, particularly the appearance of the missile-armed frigates, 
tipped the local naval balance of power around the Paracels in China’s favor� 
Saigon soon realized that it was unable to reverse the new realities on the ground 
and eventually backed down�
After the dust had settled, the Chinese leadership began to consider steps for 
consolidating China’s presence on the Paracels� In July 1974, the State Council 
and the MAC jointly issued a formal fortification plan� Beijing put Liu Huaqing, 
then the PLAN’s deputy chief of staff, in charge of garrisoning the Paracels� Liu 
led a ten-member team to Woody Island for an on-site inspection in October 
1974� The following month, Liu briefed the PLAN’s leadership� Liu’s findings 
would become the basis for constructing shore facilities, including an airfield and 
a port, and for administering the island garrison in subsequent years�39
ASSESSMENT OF THE BATTLE
Recent Chinese publications have revealed, in vivid detail, a complex campaign 
that involved various implements of maritime power, ranging from trawlers to 
militia to submarines� Firsthand accounts make clear that it was not an easy win� 
Leaders had to be resourceful, improvising solutions along the way to make up 
for the decrepit material state of the PLAN� Chinese commanders committed 
their fair share of blunders even as they caught some big breaks� Friction be-
deviled the Chinese navy� This more complete picture of the incident provides 
a sounder basis for evaluating the campaign and for assessing the lessons the 
Chinese may have learned from the battle�
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Primacy of Politics. China’s political leadership retained a firm grip on all aspects 
of the campaign�40 Operational imperatives repeatedly gave way to larger strategic 
considerations� On the day the Vietnamese landed on Robert and Money Islands, 
Mao Zedong personally approved the initial decision to respond more forceful-
ly�41 He would maintain a watchful eye throughout the conflict� As the PLAN as-
sembled its forces, the MAC stood up a six-member leading small group, headed 
by Marshal Ye Jianying and Deng Xiaoping to supervise the entire operation�42 
Working out of the Xishan Command Center under the General Staff Depart-
ment, the group assumed direct operational control and reported directly to 
Chairman Mao and the Politburo� Ye and Deng set the parameters of the cam-
paign and asserted their will at key junctures during the battle and its aftermath�
Uncertainties surrounding possible U�S� reactions to escalation in the Paracels 
may in part explain the close political oversight of the operation� On the one 
hand, the 1973 Paris Peace Accords and the subsequent withdrawal of all U�S� 
combat forces in South Vietnam had dramatically reduced America’s stake in the 
fate of its client� The burden had shifted to Saigon to look after its own security� 
War weariness afflicted decision makers in Washington as well� Simultaneously, 
Sino-American ties were still basking in the afterglow of rapprochement in 1972� 
Both sides were eager to court each other’s friendship to counterbalance the 
Soviet threat� China’s tepid response to the U�S� mining of Haiphong following 
Hanoi’s Easter offensive signaled that great-power interests had eclipsed those 
of the regional players� The crisis over the Paracels thus represented a golden 
opportunity to seize the islands while China’s strategic value to the United States 
remained very high�
On the other hand, Saigon was still Washington’s ally� Equally worrying to 
the Chinese, the United States had appeared tacitly to support its client’s posi-
tion throughout the American phase of the Vietnam War; U�S� reconnaissance 
flights over the Paracels in the 1960s had drawn numerous protests from China� 
A violent clash of arms was certain to draw Washington’s unwanted attention� 
Moreover, any U�S� diplomatic or military support to the RVN almost certainly 
would have transformed the strategic landscape and the local balance of power� 
The imperative to keep the United States out, even if direct American involve-
ment was deemed unlikely, probably shaped the conduct of operations�
Recent Chinese accounts suggest that decision makers in Beijing carefully 
weighed the risk of U�S� intervention during the crisis as they contemplated each 
move� According to Admiral Kong Zhaonian, then the deputy commander of the 
Chinese navy, the tactical principle of not firing the first shot in part reflected 
worries about third-party intervention�43 By conceding the first tactical move to 
the RVN Navy—so went the logic—China could cast South Vietnam as the ag-
gressor, thus complicating America’s diplomatic position� The Chinese therefore 
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framed (and still regard) the engagement as a “counterattack in self-defense�” 
Conversely, evidence that China had drawn first blood might have given Wash-
ington a more tangible reason to back Saigon�
Such caution extended to the battle’s immediate aftermath� Buoyed by opera-
tional success, the South Sea Fleet’s commander, Zhang Yuanpei, ordered his war-
ships to give chase and sink the fleeing enemy vessels; but the commander of the 
Guangzhou Military Region, Xu Shiyou, speaking for the MAC, countermanded 
Zhang’s directive�44 Fears of horizontal escalation again stayed the PLAN’s hand�
Concerns about a hostile U�S� response also stimulated debate about evicting 
Vietnamese forces from Robert, Pattle, and Money Islands� Intelligence reports 
that U�S� Navy warships were headed to the Paracels from the Philippines further 
alarmed the leading small group�45 While the PLAN was likely tempted to ride the 
momentum of victory at sea, such a seizure would represent a major escalation� 
Chinese leaders feared that Washington might interpret such a climb up the lad-
der as a threat to the prebattle status quo� Admiral Kong recalled that even though 
plans and forces were in place to conduct the island landings, local commanders 
held back until their political masters made up their minds� Members of the lead-
ing small group apparently agonized over the decision to put troops ashore� In 
the end, Ye Jianying and Deng Xiaoping adjudicated the debate and ordered the 
Guangzhou Military Region to go forward with the amphibious assault�46
The absence of outside intervention—due in no small part to tight political 
control of military operations—was crucial to the strategic success of the naval 
engagement�
David vs. Goliath. The battle exposed China’s military vulnerability to its south� 
Owing to Sino-Soviet and cross-strait tensions, Beijing’s strategic gaze was riveted 
to the north and east� Not surprisingly, the PLAN’s most capable ships belonged 
to the North Sea and East Sea Fleets� The South Sea Fleet’s feeble force structure 
reflected the South China Sea’s backwater status� As the crisis unfolded, the fleet 
had few seagoing forces suitable for operations in the Paracels, a predicament 
certainly made worse by the travails experienced during the Cultural Revolu-
tion� The frigate Nanning, a converted ex–Imperial Japanese Navy warship, was 
well past its service life� As noted, the three Type 065 frigates were not ready for 
sea duty� The PLAN’s fast-attack craft suffered from limited range and question-
able seaworthiness� Only the submarine chasers and minesweepers possessed the 
range to sustain patrols that far south�
Chinese commentators frequently point to the unfavorable tactical situation 
confronting PLAN commanders on the eve of battle�47 The RVN Navy clearly 
outsized and outgunned the PLAN: HQ-4 displaced nearly 1,600 tons at full load 
and was armed with two three-inch guns; HQ-5 and HQ-16 each displaced about 
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1,766 tons and were each equipped with a five-inch gun; HQ-10 displaced 650 
tons and carried a three-inch gun� By contrast, the PLAN’s Kronshtadt-class sub-
marine chaser, Type 010 oceangoing minesweeper, and Hainan-class sub chaser 
displaced 310, 500, and 500 tons, respectively� All were armed with smaller- 
caliber guns than their Vietnamese counterparts� As one study notes, even the 
largest PLAN ship was smaller than the RVN’s smallest vessel�48
Yet China’s navy won� Chinese analysts credit the officers and sailors alike for 
their tactical skill and élan�49 Such intangible qualities, in their eyes, more than 
made up for the PLAN’s lack of heft and firepower� Indeed, the fighting spirit of 
No� 398’s crew, which engaged in the equivalent of hand-to-hand combat against 
HQ-10, remains part of the Chinese navy’s lore� That the PLAN overcame such 
material asymmetries certainly dovetailed with the service’s long-standing small-
ship ethos� From the founding of the People’s Republic, the Chinese navy found 
itself struggling from a position of inferiority against the U�S�-backed Nationalist 
forces� Yet in the 1950s and 1960s the PLAN repeatedly bested its archrival at 
sea, employing speed, daring, and stratagems� To Chinese observers, the battle 
for the Paracels thus represents yet another example of how an enterprising and 
determined weaker side can beat the strong�
However, such a feel-good story is overly simplistic, if not misleading� The 
PLAN’s success resulted as much from Vietnamese incompetence and mistakes 
as it did from Chinese tactical virtuosity�50 For example, some Chinese analysts 
criticize the RVN Navy for dividing the flotilla during the initial approach on the 
morning of 19 January� Had the Vietnamese concentrated their forces and their 
fire—so goes this line of reasoning—they might have picked off PLAN warships 
in sequence�51 At the same time, the decision to charge Chinese positions was im-
prudent� Proximity played to the opponent’s strengths while negating the RVN’s 
advantages in range and firepower� Had the Vietnamese struck the Chinese from 
a greater distance (assuming the crews possessed the necessary gunnery skills), 
they might have avoided the close-in combat that so favored China’s tactical 
preferences� In other words, a more capable and less cooperative opponent might 
have changed the battle’s outcome� A false lesson thus lurks for the Chinese�
Fog, Friction, and Chance. During this battle Carl von Clausewitz would have 
instantly recognized “the countless minor incidents” that “combine to lower the 
general level of performance�”52 The terribly timed mechanical failures of the Type 
065 frigates—the South Sea Fleet’s most suitable combatants for the mission—set 
back the PLAN just as tensions rose in the Paracels� Had the frigates been avail-
able and rushed to the scene, the battle might have tipped even more favorably 
toward China� Alternatively, their presence might have deterred the Vietnamese 
from attacking in the first place�53
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However, the Chinese improvised, and managed—barely—to cobble together 
a flotilla in response to the RVN’s naval presence� Even so, the PLAN was very 
fortunate that the weather cooperated� The operation took place during the 
northeast monsoon season, when surges—involving gusts of forty knots or 
more—can strike without much warning� Had nature turned against the PLA, 
the small combatants would have had trouble handling the rough seas, spelling 
trouble for the entire operation� The PLAN was as lucky as it was good�
Command-and-control problems plagued the Chinese� On the night of 17 
January, reinforcements consisting of torpedo boats were on their way to the Pa-
racels but were recalled because of overlapping chains of command� The PLAN’s 
deputy commander had arranged for the short-legged craft to refuel at Woody 
Island before heading into the combat zone� Unaware of the plan, the Guangzhou 
Military Region’s commander ordered the ships back to port, citing lack of fuel�54 
Had the torpedo boats been present when hostilities broke out, the PLAN might 
have won an even more decisive battle� Alternatively, the Vietnamese might have 
backed down instead of picking a fight�
The late arrival of sub chasers Nos� 281 and 282 was yet another instance of 
poor communications� On the night of 18 January, Wei Mingsen, the flotilla 
commander, had received intelligence that the Vietnamese planned to attack the 
next day� He thus requested that fleet headquarters dispatch Nos� 281 and 282, 
which were awaiting instructions at Woody Island, only three to four hours away� 
Yet it took the two ships more than twelve hours to arrive, well after the heaviest 
fighting had ended� A postbattle investigation revealed that the South Sea Fleet 
headquarters in Zhanjiang failed to follow proper communications protocol, thus 
contributing to the significant delay in relaying the deployment orders�55 Had the 
ships reached the Paracels earlier, the confrontation might have unfolded quite 
differently�
The inability of the PLAN’s land-based airpower, centered on the J-6 fighter, 
to conduct sustained combat air patrols exposed the Chinese flotilla to enemy 
airpower� South Vietnam’s F-5 fighters similarly lacked the range to loiter over 
the Paracels for more than five to fifteen minutes� Some Chinese analysts believe 
that the appearance of the J-6s over the Paracels, even for a short time, boosted 
morale and produced a certain deterrent effect on the adversary�56 But this asser-
tion is difficult to test and verify� The Chinese were simply fortunate that the air 
was uncontested�
Chance favored the Chinese navy again when Mao ordered the East Sea Fleet 
to send reinforcements to the Paracels� Interfleet cooperation was rare, if not un-
heard of, with regional fleet autonomy the norm� It is unclear whether the lack of 
interoperability added to the friction� Intriguingly, Taiwan did not object to the 
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transit through the strait and made no moves to obstruct passage, even though it 
was well positioned to harass the PLAN warships�57 The Chinese leadership, brac-
ing for a possible Nationalist ambush, was puzzled and pleasantly surprised by 
this conspicuous inactivity�58 Taiwan was clearly a complicating factor that could 
have, at the very least, delayed the arrival of the three frigates� Beijing’s ability to 
maneuver forces along the maritime periphery depended on Taipei’s acquies-
cence, if not goodwill� Perhaps leaders on both sides of the strait tacitly agreed 
that South Vietnam’s position in the South China Sea needed to be overturned�
In another example of Clausewitzian fog and friction, a Chinese oiler piloted 
by a crew unfamiliar with local waters ran aground on a reef� The tanker was en 
route to replenish the assortment of fast-attack craft that had assembled to seize 
the Vietnamese-held islands on 20 January� The combatants, capable only of one-
way trips to the combat zone, were desperately short on fuel� Fuel-storage facili-
ties did not exist on Woody Island, so only the grounded oiler could have sup-
plied the fuel in offshore waters� Apparently out of options, the South Sea Fleet 
ordered submarine 157 to step in as a substitute� After filling its ballast tanks with 
fuel, the boat sprinted to the Paracels at full speed on the surface, a particularly 
risky move in a time of hostilities� This hastily improvised and highly unorthodox 
method of delivering fuel worked, to the relief of Chinese naval commanders� 
Even so, this logistical failure left the PLAN’s flotilla dangerously exposed to a 
vigorous Vietnamese counterattack� Had the enemy contested the seas, this glitch 
could well have cascaded into disaster for the Chinese navy�
Paramilitary Instruments of Maritime Power. The civil-military integration of 
China’s maritime power, involving the militia and the fishing trawlers, contrib-
uted directly to operational success� The militia, stationed forward on Woody 
Island, acted on short notice� Akin to a rapid-response force, the militia slipped 
onto the Crescent Group’s southeastern islands under the cover of night, preempt-
ing the Vietnamese� Indeed, the militia threw back RVN commandos attempting 
to seize the islands the next day� The ability to act quickly and effectively denied 
operational objectives to the enemy while likely buying time for regular troops to 
mobilize on the mainland� Finally, the militia took part in the seizure of Robert 
and Pattle Islands that helped to secure China’s control of the entire archipelago�
At sea, trawlers Nos� 402 and 407 acted as first responders� Months before the 
battle, the fishing boats maintained initial presence in the Paracels while assert-
ing claims to the islands by planting flags on them� The trawlers then sent early 
warning to headquarters ashore when RVN warships first arrived in the Paracels� 
The leaders on board also furnished tactical intelligence to the PLAN’s local com-
manders at sea� The ships helped transfer the militia onto Duncan, Drummond, 
and Palm Islands the night before the battle and provided the means to conduct 
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landings on Vietnamese-held islands after the RVN warships fled the area� The 
fishing boats were pivotal in the rescue of crippled minesweeper No� 389�
A closer look at the institutional affiliation of Nos� 402 and 407 helps explain 
their active participation throughout the confrontation� The trawlers belonged to 
the South China Sea Aquatic Produce Company, an entity that had been operat-
ing in the Paracels since 1955�59 The company, in turn, fell under the control of 
the Paracels, Spratlys, and Zhongsha Islands Authority, a county-level adminis-
trative organ of Guangdong’s provincial government� The authority was respon-
sible for exercising sovereignty and jurisdiction over the islands and surrounding 
waters� Established in 1959, it was abolished in 2012 to yield to the establishment 
of Sansha, a prefecture-level city on Woody Island that claimed administrative 
powers over all islands and features in the South China Sea�
The fisheries company and the vessels it operated were also institutionally 
linked to the militia� The militia came under the dual leadership of Hainan’s 
military district and the Chinese Communist Party’s Work Committee of the 
Paracels, Spratlys, and Zhongsha Islands� The aforementioned authority— 
responsible for the fishing company—and the work committee formed a com-
bined agency that administered the South China Sea islands under China’s con-
trol� It is thus not surprising that Nos� 402 and 407 coordinated so closely with 
their militia and PLA counterparts� The PLAN drew strength from interagency 
cooperation�
Wei Mingsen revealed that the fishing company’s deputy director, Zhang 
Binglin, was on board No� 407 to supervise the trawlers personally� In fact, Zhang 
boarded Wei’s ship to share intelligence about the Vietnamese prior to battle 
and organized the 18 January militia landings on the islands� According to Wei, 
Zhang was a demobilized PLA soldier who boasted of “rich combat experience�”60 
Yang Gui, the captain of No� 407 and leader of the militia on board, also conferred 
with Wei in person to confirm the presence of HQ-16�61 Yang has described the 
core of his fishermen as “first-rate militia�”62 Both Wei and Yang recalled that 
militia had ready access to grenades, high-powered rifles, and machine guns 
below decks�
In contrast to a naval presence that could have conveyed belligerence, the 
trawlers gave China a low-profile means to back up its territorial claims� Even 
though the fishing boats engaged in provocative behavior, the ambiguities sur-
rounding their identity and purpose furnished plausible deniability to Chinese 
leaders� The ostensibly civilian character of the trawlers added ammunition to 
Beijing’s diplomatic narrative that Saigon was the aggressor� Indeed, a U�S� intel-
ligence report cited “Saigon’s military response to the move of Chinese fishermen 
into the Crescent group” as the “key step in the escalation�”63 This interpretation 
conformed to the story that Beijing likely wanted to tell�
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HISTORY RHYMING?
Chinese behavior during the 2012 Scarborough Shoal incident exhibits opera-
tional preferences that echo the 1974 Sino-Vietnamese clash in the Paracels� The 
more recent crisis began when a Philippine reconnaissance aircraft detected 
five Chinese fishing trawlers working near the shoal, located some two hundred 
kilometers west of Luzon Island� To investigate the activities taking place inside 
what the Philippines considers its exclusive economic zone, Manila dispatched 
the navy’s flagship, BRP Gregorio del Pilar (a former U�S� Coast Guard cutter)� 
The discovery of coral, clams, and sharks on board the Chinese boats set in mo-
tion an action-reaction cycle� As the Philippine Navy sought to stop the poach-
ers from hauling home the illegal catch, two China Marine Surveillance vessels 
intervened, precluding further Philippine attempts to enforce the law� To ease 
tensions, Manila recalled the frigate and deployed a coast guard vessel in its place� 
Rather than reciprocate the gesture, Beijing turned up the pressure by sending the 
Fisheries Law Enforcement Command’s newest ship, adding heft to the Chinese 
show of resolve�
With at least eight Chinese vessels facing off against a lone Philippine cutter, 
the balance of forces clearly favored Beijing� Moreover, in the event of escalation, 
China’s civilian boats and paramilitary forces could count on the long reach of the 
PLAN’s striking power� While Chinese warships largely stayed out of sight dur-
ing the crisis, their presence just beyond the horizon likely influenced Manila’s 
strategic calculus� Even so, the Philippines refused to back down, leading to a 
months-long stalemate at sea� To bring an end to the standoff and arrest further 
deterioration in bilateral ties, the United States brokered a behind-the-scenes 
deal in which both sides agreed to remove their ships from the area� But shortly 
after the mutual withdrawals, China sent back its maritime law enforcement 
ships and closed off access to the shoal� Since then, Beijing has maintained a 
presence there, retaining de facto control of the feature and surrounding waters�
Just as armed trawlers played an outsize role throughout the Paracels cam-
paign, civilian and paramilitary vessels took part in the Scarborough Shoal in-
cident� Chinese fishing boats triggered both crises by engaging in activities that, 
at least in the eyes of rival claimants, were illicit or provocative� Militia-crewed 
boats in 1974 and paramilitary ships in 2012 acted as China’s first line of defense, 
helping to probe the intentions and capabilities of their opponents while asserting 
Beijing’s claims� The noncombatant vessels enjoyed the protection of the PLAN 
even as they served as the eyes and ears of the Chinese navy� Such mutual sup-
port enabled China to evaluate the tactical circumstances; demonstrate resolve 
without militarizing the confrontation during the initial stages; calibrate the level 
of coercive pressure needed to compel the opponent’s will; and, should deterrence 
fail, apply force�
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The civilian character of the Chinese vessels constrained their rivals’ navies� 
The South Vietnamese and Philippine navies were apparently loath to fire di-
rectly on lightly armed or unarmed civilian vessels, lest they risk major escalation 
or diplomatic fallout� The two services thus found themselves maneuvering and 
posturing in vain to expel the Chinese ships� Even as China’s maritime presence 
imposed a stalemate, Beijing depicted its adversaries’ naval actions as major prov-
ocations, opening the way for a more muscular show of force� Nonmilitary units 
also deprived outside powers, such as the United States, of adequate rationale to 
intervene, yet they were more than enough to signal resolve to the local actors�
In both cases, Beijing waited for the other side to cross a red line before taking 
action that decisively settled the dispute in its favor� China’s maritime services 
sprang into action only after South Vietnam and the Philippines committed 
their navies to confront the Chinese� Whether Beijing consciously maneuvered 
its opponents into making the apparent first move or its rivals stumbled into that 
first move is unclear� This “second-mover advantage” presumably conferred on 
China the moral high ground to achieve more ambitious territorial objectives� As 
Thomas Christensen observes, “It often appears that Beijing is waiting for provo-
cations by others to legitimize Chinese actions that will consolidate control over 
the islands that China has claimed for decades but not administered in the past�”64 
Similarly, Christopher Yung and Patrick McNulty contend that “China may be 
engaging in a ‘status quo plus’ approach to maritime territorial dispute manage-
ment, maintaining the status quo until a rival acts to advance its territorial claims, 
and then responding vigorously to leave its rival in a disadvantaged position�”65
In both confrontations, the Chinese penchant for conceding the first move, 
at least as China perceived it, extended to tactical rules of engagement� In 1974, 
Chinese combatants were under strict orders not to fire the first shot� Demon-
strating impressive discipline under duress, the PLAN unleashed its firepower 
only after the RVN Navy obligingly launched the initial salvo� While the 2012 
standoff avoided a firefight, the burden was on the Philippines to evict the 
nonmilitary Chinese vessels through greater staying power or force� Beijing in 
essence dared Manila to punch first, confident in the knowledge that it would 
overwhelm the outgunned Philippine navy in retaliation� Manila wisely refused 
to take the bait� A similar dynamic is discernible in the ongoing Sino-Japanese 
tussle over the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands� China Coast Guard vessels regularly 
intrude into or near the islands’ territorial waters, perhaps in hopes of setting off 
an overreaction�
After Beijing forcibly ousted Saigon and nudged out Manila by way of third-
party intervention, it built up overbearing power in the disputed areas that shut 
out the rival claimants� The combined military-civilian flotilla that appeared 
in force near the Paracels not only cemented China’s operational gains but also 
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conferred permanence on the new status quo� Zhang Zhaozhong, a retired admi-
ral and well-known talking head in Chinese media, memorably dubbed Beijing’s 
postcrisis consolidation of its position around Scarborough a “cabbage strategy�” 
The metaphor refers to the concentric layers of security—from the navy standing 
watch at the outermost ring to the maritime law enforcement ships and fishing 
boats patrolling along the inner rings—that surround the shoal� By hardening a 
new reality with physical presence, China sought to telegraph irreversibility to 
outside audiences�
CHALLENGES AHEAD
The United States and its regional partners confront an increasingly competitive 
maritime environment� From a strictly material perspective, the Chinese navy 
today is incomparably more powerful than it was in 1974� A replay of a weak and 
unprepared China facing off against a better-armed local opponent is virtually 
inconceivable�
At the tactical level, the roles have reversed rather dramatically: the PLAN 
outguns many of its Asian neighbors, including Vietnam, by significant margins� 
Indeed, the South Sea Fleet is no longer the neglected, rickety fleet from four 
decades ago� It now commands a large share of the service’s newest surface com-
batants and, significantly, its base in Hainan is home to nuclear attack and nuclear 
ballistic missile submarines�
Woody Island has evolved from a primitive outpost four decades ago to a 
staging area from which fighters and warships can be launched� Farther south, a 
group of newly created artificial islands boasts runways and port facilities that can 
accommodate PLA air and naval forces� Should a network of mutually support-
ing, well-defended bases emerge across the South China Sea, a permanent for-
ward presence would add teeth to China’s coercive leverage in maritime disputes�
Overall, China now possesses the military power to impose costs on the 
United States about which Chinese leaders in 1974 could have only dreamed� 
Modern Chinese destroyers, frigates, fast-attack craft, and submarines bristle 
with long-range antiship cruise missiles that can strike from standoff distances� 
Shore-based aircraft and truck-mounted cruise and ballistic missiles can reach 
deep into the South China Sea, furnishing the kinds of protective cover that naval 
units in 1974 sorely lacked�
Somewhat counterintuitively, a more powerful PLA could render unnecessary 
violent clashes like the Paracels battle� Instead, China may rely even more on 
its maritime law enforcement ships—the signature feature of China’s maritime 
coercion in recent years—to assert its territorial claims while the Chinese navy 
backstops such noncombatant units from just over the horizon� The Scarborough 
Shoal incident and the ongoing face-off over the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands 
NWC_Spring2016Review.indb   60 3/8/16   10:29 AM
20
Naval War College Review, Vol. 69 [2016], No. 2, Art. 6
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss2/6
 YO S H I HA R A  6 1
amply demonstrate this civil-military integration of maritime power� Greater 
conventional military means will thus further empower irregular forces to im-
pose China’s will on rival claimants� And, if all else fails, Beijing can still call on 
its navy to settle a dispute� That China—unlike its weaker rivals—has the option 
of climbing the escalation ladder only amplifies the intimidation factor� Indeed, 
the navy’s lurking presence may induce an opponent to back down in a crisis, as 
it apparently did during the Scarborough confrontation�
Even as the PLAN bulks up on more-capable platforms, China’s maritime 
paramilitary forces are growing and modernizing at a breathtaking pace� Accord-
ing to a 2015 Pentagon report, China is pursuing “the largest MLE [maritime law 
enforcement] modernization effort in Asia” and “China’s MLE fleet � � � is likely to 
increase in size by 25 percent and is larger than that of all of the other claimants 
combined�”66 The Paracels battle illustrates that China’s employment of paramili-
tary units at sea is by no means a new phenomenon� Moreover, the clash reveals a 
well-pedigreed institutional nexus between the military and the maritime militia� 
Decades-long adherence to People’s War under Mao helped hone the kinds of 
doctrine, personnel, command-and-control, and administrative structures well 
suited to combining conventional and irregular means� Such creative uses of ci-
vilian and militia personnel date back centuries; there may be more continuity to 
current Chinese strategy in offshore disputes than is commonly acknowledged�67 
Washington and other, Asian capitals should recognize that the complex inter-
play of Chinese naval and nonmilitary instruments of sea power will likely be a 
permanent fixture in regional maritime disputes�
Hybrid warfare, to use today’s parlance, is neither novel nor unique to China� 
Russia, too, resorted to the use of paramilitary troops to dismember parts of 
Ukraine while avoiding a wider conflict with the West� There is thus an underly-
ing logic of strategy that transcends the peculiarities of China’s way of warfare� 
The apparent efficacy of mixing unorthodox methods with traditional tools of 
war suggests that China may turn to this playbook again in future confrontations 
in the South China Sea� With a more formidable conventional military backing 
up China’s large and growing paramilitary forces, hybrid warfare could become 
an even more attractive and effective option for Beijing in the coming years� The 
United States and other stakeholders in the region must be alert to this prospect�
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